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Moral Relativism and Human Rights
Torben Spaak*
1. INTRODUCTION
Politicians, human rights activists, scholars, and others disagree
about whether human rights are universally true or valid or only true or
valid relative to a given culture.1 Jack Donnelly, for example, defends (what
he refers to as) the moral universality of human rights:
If human rights are the rights one has simply because one is
a human being, as they are usually thought to be, then they
are held "universally," by all human beings. They also hold
"universally" against all other persons and institutions. As
the highest moral rights, they regulate the fundamental
structures and practices of political life, and in ordinary cir-
cumstances they take priority over other moral, legal, and
political claims. These distinctions encompass what I call
the moral universality of human rights. 2
Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, on the other hand, appear to
believe that human rights can only be valid relative to a given culture.3 The
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of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. I would like to thank Erik Carlson, Claes
Lemestedt and Sia Spiliopoulou-Akermark for helpful comments on the article. I
would also like to thank the participants in a seminar at Riga Graduate School of
Law in May 2004 as well as the participants in a seminar organized by SIFIR at the
Department of Law, Uppsala University in November 2004 for comments on my
presentation of some of the ideas put forward in this article. Finally, I would like to
thank Robert Carroll for checking my English. The usual caveat applies: the author
alone is responsible for any remaining mistakes and imperfections.
I Donald Puchala, "The Ethics of Globalism", available at http://www.yale.edu/
acuns/publications/95Holmes-Lecture.htmil. See also Guyora Binder, Cultural Rel-
ativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 211 (1999). Cf Christina M. Cema, Universality of Human Rights and Cul-
tural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Con-
texts, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 740 (1994).
2 JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (2d
ed. 2003). See also Jeremy Waldron, How to Argue for a Universal Claim, 30
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 305, 313 (1998-99).
3 Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western Construct with
Limited Applicability, HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
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authors maintain that the political philosophy on which the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights is based is distinctively Western, and that efforts
to impose the Declaration as it stands on people in the non-Western world
amount to "moral chauvinism and ethnocentric bias.
' 4
I take it that critics such as Pollis and Schwab believe that wes-
terners ought to tolerate (what they consider to be) human rights violations
in other parts of the world, since such violations may be morally acceptable
in light of the moral values and standards accepted by the people involved.
True, Pollis and Schwab themselves do not speak of tolerance, but they do
object to moral chauvinism on the part of the enforcers of the Declaration
(or other similar documents); and it seems to me that tolerance would be the
alternative to moral chauvinism.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it appears to be pre-
mised on the assumption that the theory of moral relativism enjoins toler-
ance of other moral views or that acceptance of such relativism is otherwise
likely to bring about such tolerance. I shall, however, argue that the theory
of moral relativism does not enjoin tolerance of other moral views, that
there is no reason to believe that moral relativism is otherwise likely to
bring about tolerance, and that therefore it does not matter to this debate
whether moral relativism is a true (or defensible) theory.
I begin by distinguishing three types of moral relativism, including
so-called meta-ethical relativism, and argue that meta-ethical relativism is
at the core of the cultural relativism/universalism debate.5 I then offer some
arguments in support of meta-ethical relativism. 6 Having done that, I pro-
ceed to consider the relation between meta-ethical relativism and tolerance7
and between meta-ethical relativism and the importance of moral considera-
tions.8 The article concludes with some reflections on the prerequisites of
cultural imperialism 9 and the enforcement of international human rights
law.1 0
1 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds. 1979). See also Chandra Muzaffar, From
Human Rights to Human Dignity, DEBATING HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (Peter van Ness
ed. 1999).
4 Pollis & Schwab, supra note 3, at 14. See also Puchala, supra note 1, at 3.
5 See infra Part II.
6 See infra Part III.
7 See infra Part IV.
8 See infra Part V.
9 See infra Part VI.
10 See infra Part VII.
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2. MORAL RELATIVISM
Philosophers often distinguish between cognitive and moral relativ-
ism.1 Cognitive relativists maintain (i) that truth, or knowledge, or rational-
ity, or even reality itself is relative to a certain starting point, such as a
person's or a group's conceptual scheme, and (ii) that no such starting point
is truer than any other. Thomas Kuhn, for example, maintains that one can
only say that one scientific theory is better than another within a certain
paradigm, that no one paradigm is truer than any other, and that therefore
scientific change can only be explained by reference to psychological or
sociological factors. 12
Cognitive relativism is different from cognitive nihilism understood
as the denial that there is such a thing as truth, reality, etcetera, and from
cognitive skepticism understood as the denial that we can have about
knowledge of truth, reality, etcetera. Cognitive relativists maintain that
there is indeed truth, reality, etcetera and that we can have knowledge of it.
Of course, they mean by 'truth' or 'knowledge' relative truth or knowledge,
which means that they owe us an account of these notions. 13
Moral relativism comes in at least three distinct forms, namely de-
scriptive, normative, and meta-ethical relativism.1 4 According to descriptive
relativism, different people accept different fundamental moral views. Rich-
ard Brandt states the following:
The values, or ethical principles, of individuals conflict in a
fundamental way ... A special form of this thesis, called
"cultural relativism," is that such ethical disagreements
often follow cultural lines. The cultural relativist empha-
sizes the cultural tradition as a prime source of the individ-
ual's views and thinks that most disagreements in ethics
among individuals stem from enculturation in different eth-
ical traditions, although he need not deny that some ethical
disagreements among individuals arise from differences of
11 See, e.g., PAUL O'GRADY, RELATIVISM 4 (2002); Cf Michael Krausz & Jack W.
Meiland, Introduction, RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE AND MORAL 1 (Michael Krausz &
Jack W. Meiland eds. 1982). See also Louis P. Pojman, Relativism, THE CAM-
BRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 790 (2d ed. 1999).
12 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION 290 (1977).
13 , See Chris Swoyer, True for, RELATIVISM, supra note 5, at 84, for an analysis
of the idea of relative truth.
14 See Richard Brandt, Ethical Relativism, MORAL RELATIVISM: A READER 25
(Paul K. Moser & Thomas L. Carson eds. 2003). See also WILLIAM K. FRANKENA,
ETHICS 109-10 (1973).
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innate constitution or personal history between the
individuals.15
Most writers seem to accept the thesis of descriptive relativism, 16
though some question whether the moral differences that do exist are really
fundamental, that is, they question whether in at least some cases the differ-
ences are not due to factual disagreements.' 7
Normative relativism differs from descriptive relativism in that it
holds that a person ought to act in accordance with his own or his group's
views on some issue. As Richard Brandt explains, whereas individual nor-
mative relativism has it that an individual's moral view is correct if he
thinks it is correct, social group normative relativism maintains that an indi-
vidual's moral view is correct if it is in keeping with the moral views of his
social group. 8 The latter is the most common type of normative relativism.
Meta-ethical relativism, finally, holds that moral truth or validity is
relative to a given moral framework, and that no such framework is truer or
more valid than any other framework. As Gilbert Harman puts it, "moral
right and wrong (good and bad, justice and injustice, virtue and vice, etc.)
are always relative to a choice of moral framework. What is morally right in
relation to one moral framework can be morally wrong in relation to a dif-
ferent moral framework. And no moral framework is objectively privileged
as the one true morality."' 19
Meta-ethical relativism thus conceived is different from moral skep-
ticism understood as the denial that we can have knowledge of what is mor-
15 Brandt, supra note 14, at 25.
16 See, e.g., Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism, GILBERT HARMAN & JUDITH
JARVIS THOMSON, MORAL OBJECTIVITY AND MORAL RELATIVISM 3, 8-11 (1996):
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 6-11 (1981): JOHN MACKIE, ETHICS 36-8
(1977); Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, NATURAL LAW
THEORY 158, 171-2 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
17 See, e.g., Michelle Moody-Adams, The Empirical Underdetermination of De-
scriptive Cultural Relativism, MORAL RELATIVISM, supra note 14, at 93: Brandt,
supra note 14, at 28-9.
I Brandt, supra note 14, at 25-8. Strictly speaking, normative individual relativ-
ists maintain that the moral values and standards accepted by an individual deter-
mine what is morally right (for him). And since a person might misunderstand or
misapply his values and standards to the case before him, his view on a particular
issue may be wrong. In other words, normative individual relativism does not ex-
clude the possibility that a person may be mistaken in the particular case.
19 Harman, supra note 16, at 3. See also T. M. Scanlon, Fear of Relativism,
MORAL RELATIVISM, supra note 14, at 142-3.
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ally right and wrong. 20 Meta-ethical relativists believe that we can have
such knowledge, though they mean by "moral truth" or "moral validity"
relative moral truth or validity.
As should be clear, it is meta-ethical relativism - not descriptive or
normative relativism - that is at the center of the cultural relativism/univer-
salism debate.2' The core claim that has been affirmed or denied by the
parties to the debate, often implicitly, is that human rights can only be true
or valid in light of a given cultural framework. 22 Since this is so, I shall
focus in what follows on meta-ethical relativism.
3. META-ETHICAL RELATIVISM: A DEFENSIBLE THEORY
I believe that meta-ethical relativism is a defensible theory. I do
not, of course, propose to determine once and for all whether meta-ethical
relativism is a true theory, but I can at least point to a couple of considera-
tions that lend plausibility to the theory.
Moral philosophers make a distinction between moral realism,
which has it that moral facts are mind-independent in the sense that they are
conceptually independent of our beliefs that are the evidence that those
facts obtain, and moral anti-realism, which has it that moral facts do not
exist at all (non-cognitivism) or that their existence is dependent on the
beliefs and desires of human beings (idealism or constructionism).23 We see
that while meta-ethical relativism is compatible with anti-realism, it is in-
compatible with moral realism - if there were mind-independent moral
facts, it could not be the case that no moral framework is truer or more valid
than any other.
As I see it, moral anti-realism is a defensible theory. First, the exis-
tence of widespread moral disagreement supports the claim that there are
no mind-independent moral facts.24 Although there has been disagreement
'0 Moral skepticism comes in a number of different versions. See Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, Moral Skepticism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Summer 2002 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/skepticism-moral/.
21 This has been noted by Alison Dundes Renteln, among others. See Alison
Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, 90 AMERICAN AN-
THROPOLOGIST, NEW SERIES 56, 60-2 (1988).
22 See Puchala, supra note 1, at 3, for more on this topic.
23 See DAVID 0. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS Ch. 2
(1989), for more about moral realism and anti-realism, including mind-
independence.
24 See, e.g., Harman, supra note 16, at 8-11; JOHN MACKIE, ETHICS 36-8 (1976).
This has been observed by a number of additional authors.
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in sciences such as history and biology and cosmology as well, it seems that
disagreement in the field of morals differs importantly from disagreement
in those other fields. For, as John Mackie points out, moral disagreement
cannot plausibly be thought of as resulting from speculative inferences or
explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evidence. Instead, as Mackie
suggests, "[d]isagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people's ad-
herence to and participation in different ways of life. 25
Second, it seems that if there were mind-independent moral facts,
we should be able to agree on some sort of method for solving moral dis-
agreements.26 But so far we have not been able to reach such agreement.
For example, consequentialists and deontologists cannot agree about the
relevance of consequences in moral thinking. To be sure, there may be fea-
tures of our moral thinking - such as the point of moral inquiry and, per-
haps, the form and content of moral claims - that are best explained by the
assumption that there are mind-independent moral facts, 27 but we neverthe-
less have to acknowledge that we cannot agree on a method for solving
moral disagreements. And that is a reason to doubt the existence of mind-
independent moral facts.
Third, it seems that moral realists cannot account for the fact that
moral claims are closely bound up with moral motivation.2 8 The idea is that
beliefs - as distinguished from desires - are motivationally inert, and that
therefore moral realists - who hold that moral claims express beliefs about
mind-independent moral facts - cannot account for the motivational aspect
of moral claims.
The idea that moral judgments are closely bound up with moral
motivation is usually referred to as internalisin and can be spelled out in
different ways. It is, however, controversial. 29 Critics maintain, inter alia,
25 MACKIE, supra note 24, at 36. See also Harman, supra note 16, at 8-11.
26 See Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectiviy, NATURAL LAW
THEORY 158 171-6 (Robert P. George ed. 1992).
27 See BRINK, supra note 23, at 23-5; MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM 5-6
(1994), for more on this topic.
28 See BRINK, supra note 23, at Ch. 3, for a discussion of this type of critique of
moral realism,
29 While a number of prominent moral philosophers have accepted internalism,
other equally prominent moral philosophers have rejected it. Those who accept
some form of internalism include SIMON BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD 188
(1984); R. M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952); THOMAS NAGEL, THE
POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 7 (1970): SMITH, supra note 21, at Ch. 3; Charles Leslie
Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, 46 MIND 14, 16 (1937). Those
who reject internalism include: BRINK, supra note 23, at Ch. 3; William Frankena,
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that it cannot explain the existence of amoralists, that is, people who remain
unmoved by what they recognize as moral considerations. 30 Internalists
have responded that a person who states, say, that one ought to keep one's
promises and adds that he doesn't care about it, is not really making a moral
judgment.31
There is a problem here, however. The internalist objection to
moral realism seems to be equally applicable to the type of moral anti-
realism called constructionism. For constructionists - who hold that moral
claims express beliefs about mind-dependent moral facts - cannot account
for the motivational aspect of moral claims anymore than moral realists can.
The objection does not, of course, apply to non-cognitivism, since this the-
ory does not hold that moral claims express beliefs at all, but feelings, atti-
tudes, etc.
While these considerations support moral anti-realism, with the
qualification just mentioned, they offer only indirect support for meta-ethi-
cal relativism. For both main types of moral anti-realism - noncognitivism
and constructivism (or idealism) - come in a relativist and a non-relativist
form.3 2 But in my view they both lead naturally to meta-ethical relativism.
For under both types of theory, moral right and obligation will depend on
the preferences or attitudes of people, and these are likely to vary quite a
bit. The standard way for moral anti-realists to avoid meta-ethical relativism
is to argue that moral right and obligation depends in some way on what a
rational agent would do or choose,33 but it is not obvious which is the cor-
rect theory of rationality.34 Of course, non-relativist anti-realists might think
of some other way to defend a non-relativist anti-realist theory, but we have
yet to see the result of such an effort.
Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy, ESSAYS ON MORAL PHI-
LOSOPHY 40 (A. I. Melden ed. 1958).
30 BRINK, supra note 23, at 46-9.
31 See SMITH, supra note 27, at 66-71.
32 See T. M. Scanlon, supra note 19, at 143-4, for a brief discussion of the possi-
bility of non-cognitivist relativism. See also Mark van Roojen, Moral Cognitivism
vs. Non-Cognitivism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Winter 2005
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2005/entries/moral-cognitivism/.
33 See, e.g., DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT Ch. 1 (1986); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE Ch. 3(1971).
34 See Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser, Relativism and Normative Nonreal-
ism: Basing Morality on Rationality, MORAL RELATIVISM, supra note 14, at 287, for
more on this topic.
80 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 13
4. META-ETHICAL RELATIVISM AND TOLERANCE
As I said in Section 1, many people believe that there is some sort
of connection between meta-ethical relativism and tolerance of other moral
views. I shall assume here, as a rough estimation, that A tolerates B's action
D( in case A feels that (D is morally wrong, A is in a position to interfere with
0i, A is not afraid to interfere with 0i, A does not suffer from weakness of
will, etc., but A does not wish to interfere with (D.35
First of all, no version of meta-ethical relativism entails any sort of
tolerance principle. The reason is that meta-ethical relativism is a second-
order, descriptive theory, not a first-order, prescriptive theory, and that a
factual premise or set of premises cannot entail a normative conclusion.3 6
Moreover, even if meta-ethical relativism did entail a tolerance principle, it
could not be universally - but only relatively - valid. For meta-ethical rela-
tivism, if true, rules out the existence of universally valid moral norms.
One might, however, argue that the combination of meta-ethical
relativism and a normative principle that provides that we should not inter-
fere with people unless we can justify this interference to them would entail
that we ought to tolerate their moral views. This is David Wong's approach.
Chris Gowans renders Wong's argument as follows:
Perhaps the conjunction of MMR [meta-ethical relativism]
and an ethical principle could give us a reason for tolerance
we would not have on the basis of the ethical principle
alone. Such an approach has been proposed by Wong ....
the principle is, roughly speaking, that we should not inter-
fere with people unless we can justify this interference to
them (if they were rational and well-informed in relevant
respects). Wong calls this "the justification principle." Of
course, it is already a tolerance principle of sorts. The idea
is that it gains broader scope if MMR is correct. 7
35 See Geoffrey Harrison, Relativism and Tolerance, MORAL RELATIVISM, supra
note 14, at 229, 234-5, for a discussion of the meaning of "tolerance."
36 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 521 (Penguin Classics 1984
[1739]). (This is the well-known logical thesis that has been called Hume's law).
See Hye-Kyung Kim & Michael Wreen, "Relativism, Absolutism, and Tolerance,"
34:4 METAPHILOSOPHY 447, 450-2 (2003). (discussing and rejecting the possibility
of a deductive relation between meta-ethical relativism and tolerance).
17 Chris Gowans, Moral Relativism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY 2004 (Spring Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/moral-relativism/. I cite Gowans' arti-
cle because I have been unable to acquire Wong's book.
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This does not show that meta-ethical relativism enjoins tolerance,
however, because the justification principle is not part of the theory of
meta-ethical relativism. Moreover, we have seen that if meta-ethical relativ-
ism is true, then the tolerance principle itself can only be true or valid rela-
tive to a given moral framework.
Nevertheless, some maintain that acceptance of meta-ethical rela-
tivism is likely to bring about moral tolerance. Legal theorist Gustav Rad-
bruch, for example, states the following:
Relativism, which teaches that no political view is demon-
strable - and none refutable - is apt to counteract that self-
righteousness which is usual in our political controversies:
if no partisan view is demonstrable, each view is to be
fought from the standpoint of an opposite view; yet if none
is refutable either, each is to be respected even from the
standpoint of the adverse view. Thus relativism teaches
both determination in one's own attitude and justice toward
that of another.3 8
Radbruch does not really explain why meta-ethical relativism would
bring about tolerance of other moral views, however, except to say that if
no theory can be refuted, each must be respected by its adversaries. It is not,
however, clear why non-refutability should entail or imply respect. Geof-
frey Harrison suggests that those who believe that there is a necessary con-
nection between meta-ethical relativism and tolerance believe that tolerance
would be sensible and fair in a situation where neither party can prove that
his own moral theory is truer or more valid than that of his opponent.39 The
reason why tolerance would be sensible, he explains, is that it would help us
avoid a Hobbes-like state of moral nature, and the reason why it would be
fair is that neither side can conclusively prove his case and has no right to
impose his own views. He adds that since most of us accept the moral views
imposed on us by parents, teachers, and the society we live in, we cannot
reasonably look upon our moral adversaries as willfully wicked. 40
This does not, however, show that meta-ethical relativism brings
about tolerance. 41 To be sure, Harrison may be right that tolerance would be
38 See Gustav Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, in THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK,
RADBRUCH, AND DABIN 43, 48 (Edwin W. Patterson ed. 1950). Id. at 48. (Emphasis
added). The claim about relativism and democracy can be found on the same page.
39 Harrison, supra note 35, at 232.
40 Id. at 233.
41 The claim that there is a connection between meta-ethical relativism and moral
tolerance has also been rejected by David Brink, Gordon Graham, and Hye-Kyung
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sensible if it were the only way of avoiding a Hobbes-like state of moral
nature. But the same could be said about a situation in which moral realism
is the true meta-ethical theory - at least if we assume that we would be
unable to prove our case to our moral adversaries. Moreover, I cannot see
that fairness requires tolerance in a situation where neither side can conclu-
sively prove his case, nor why neither side would have no right to impose
his views. Indeed, this latter claim seems quite unwarranted. I conclude that
the line of argumentation rendered by Harrison does not add much to Rad-
bruch's claim about respect.
We should note that there is an independent reason to reject the
claim that there is a connection between meta-ethical relativism and toler-
ance. Geoffrey Harrison points out that the claim advanced by [meta-ethi-
cal] relativists that one moral system is "as good as" another, or, as I put it
earlier, that no moral framework is truer or more valid than any other, is
ambiguous: it can be understood morally or non-morally. 42 If we take 'as
good as' to be a non-moral notion, we cannot arrive at a moral conclusion
(about tolerance or anything else) unless we add a moral premise; if, on the
other hand, we take 'as good as' to be a moral notion, we can indeed arrive
at a moral conclusion (about tolerance or something else). But the moral
interpretation is problematic. For one thing, it appears to be logically as
well as psychologically impossible to believe that one's own moral theory is
not morally better than any other moral theory. As Harrison puts it, this is
one moral judgment that no participant of a moral practice - as distin-
guished from an observer of a moral practice - could ever make:
It is true that we could understand a man who said, "All
moralities apart from mine are equally good ... But if he
said, "All moralities including mine are equally good," we
should be at a loss. Could, for example, a Christian who
admitted that other religious/moral positions were just as
good as Christianity still be regarded as a Christian? I think
not, in that adopting a morality will necessarily involve re-
jecting at least some aspects of any rival doctrine which is
not compatible with one's own. 43
Kim & Michael Wreen, among others. See BRINK, supra note 17, at 93; Gordon
Graham, Tolerance, Pluralism, and Relativism, MORAL RELATIVISM, supra note 8,
at 226; Kim & Wreen, supra note 36. See also Dundes Renteln, supra note 21, at
62-3.
12 Harrison, supra note 35, at 240.
" Id. at 240. See also Betsy Postow, Dishonest Relativism, MORAL RELATIVISM,
supra note 14, at 123; Kim & Wreen, supra note 36. at 456-7.
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I find Harrison's line of reasoning persuasive: since it appears to be
logically as well as psychologically impossible to maintain that one's own
moral theory is not morally better than any other moral theory, the moral
interpretation must be rejected. This leaves us with the non-moral interpre-
tation, which is incapable of supporting a normative principle of tolerance.
But it would seem that the difficulty identified by Harrison goes
even deeper: if it is logically as well as psychologically impossible to be-
lieve that one's own moral theory is not morally better than any other moral
theory, that is, if it is impossible to embrace a first-order moral theory and
combine it with meta-ethical relativism, a moral agent, or if you will, a
participant can't be a meta-ethical relativist. 44 And this seems to indicate
that the theory is, in some sense, self-refuting. I do not think that this diffi-
culty undermines the theory, however. For the important question is not
whether a moral agent can be a meta-ethical relativist, but whether meta-
ethical relativism is a true or at least a defensible theory. In other words, the
theory properly belongs on the level of the observer, not on the level of the
participant.
5. META-ETHICAL RELATIVISM AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
MORAL CONSIDERATIONS
Thomas Scanlon considers the possibility that meta-ethical relativ-
ism might undermine the importance of moral considerations. He observes
that a person who believes in meta-ethical relativism and also believes that
what the Nazis did was terribly wrong has to admit that there might be an
equally true or valid moral framework in light of which their actions were
not morally wrong at all. And he concludes that this person will be deprived
of the sense that his condemnation of the Nazis is legitimate and justified.
Scanlon puts it as follows:
This second reason [for fearing relativism] is grounded in
the confidence we have or would like to have in our con-
demnations of wrongful conduct and of those who engage
in it. For example, when Gilbert Harman told us that "ought
to do" judgments do not apply to people who lack the rele-
vant reasons, and that we therefore cannot say that it was
wrong of Hitler to murder Jews or that he ought not to have
done it . . . this claim seemed to deprive us of something
important. It does this even if we believe that the thought
that he was behaving wrongly, in the sense that we want to
preserve, would not influence Hitler or others like him at
44 Cf STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 319 (1980).
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all. What relativism threatens to deprive us of in such a
case is . . .I would suggest, the sense that our condemna-
tion of certain actions is legitimate and justified.45
We see that Scanlon (i) adopts the point of view of a participant -
as distinguished from that of an observer - and (ii) presupposes that it is
logically and psychologically possible for the moral agent to combine belief
in meta-ethical relativism with belief in a first-order moral theory. But if we
assume, for the sake of argument, that the important question is whether the
moral agent can be a meta-ethical relativist, we may nevertheless object to
Scanlon's line of reasoning that if the agent does not (and cannot) believe
that his own moral theory is morally better than any other moral theory,
including the Nazi theory, he most likely wouldn't be bothered when he
learned that the actions of the Nazis could be defended from the standpoint
of the Nazi theory. I mean, if he really doesn't believe that his own theory is
morally better than the Nazi theory, why would he want to criticize the Nazi
theory in the first place?
In any case, we should note that even if Scanlon is right in claiming
that meta-ethical relativism undermines the importance of moral considera-
tions, this does not mean that meta-ethical relativism is a false theory. As
Scanlon makes clear, he is trying to explain why people fear (meta-ethical)
relativism, not that (or why) it is a false theory.
6. THE PREREQUISITES OF CULTURAL IMPERIALISM
I have argued that meta-ethical relativism does not bring about
moral tolerance and does not undermine the importance of moral considera-
tions. But if this is so, one may wonder about the relevance of the truth or
defensibility of meta-ethical relativism to the normative issues that appear
to be of primary concern to the participants in the cultural relativism/univer-
salism debate, such as whether to enforce international human rights law or
to be more tolerant of (what one perceives to be) human rights violations.
My position, as I have said, is that the truth or defensibility of meta-
ethical relativism is of no relevance to the normative issues just mentioned.
Why do the participants in the debate think otherwise? Their mistake,
Guyora Binder explains, is that they assume that moral values "depend not
upon culture, but upon discrete, coherent, bounded cultures.146 More specif-
ically, Binder maintains that the participants in the debate mistakenly as-
sume that the developing or post-colonial state goes together with a
"bounded" culture when in fact it doesn't, and that therefore they mistak-
41 Scanlon, supra note 19, at 148 (footnote omitted).
46 Binder, supra note 1, at 218.
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enly assume that there is a culture that can be interfered with by the enforc-
ers of international human rights law, when in fact there isn't. If Binder is
right, the prerequisites of cultural imperialism are simply not met, and this
means that tolerance is no longer an issue. And this in turn means that the
truth or defensibility of meta-ethical relativism is of no relevance to the
normative issues that are of primary concern to the participants in the de-
bate. Thus Binder reaches the same conclusion as I do by way of a different
route.
7. THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
I have argued that the truth or defensibility of meta-ethical relativ-
ism is of no relevance to the question whether to enforce international
human rights law either in general or in the particular case, because meta-
ethical relativism neither entails a principle of tolerance nor leads to toler-
ance in any other way. I would like to add that neither the truth of meta-
ethical relativism nor the truth of moral universalism would automatically
determine whether we should enforce international human rights law in
general or in the particular case. The reason is that there are a number of
other moral/political considerations, such as the value of state sovereignty
and of self-determination, that are relevant to such decisions. Whether one
should choose enforcement or tolerance either in general or in the particular
case may, among other things, depend on the gravity of the violation, on
whether the offender had been warned by the international community, or
on whether the prerequisites of successful enforcement are at hand.

